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There's an Amendment for That:
A Comprehensive Application of




We live in a changing world. Communication is increasing at
unprecedented rates. The sharing of information over massive
worldwide networks has reached proportions once unimaginable.
While a 1993 New York Times article describing the "staggering
growth rate" of the Internet referenced a figure of "200 billion bytes a
month" (roughly 2.18 terabytes per year),2 new estimates suggest that
by 2013, this number will reach roughly 700 million terabytes per
3year.
The growing ubiquity of "smart phones" has assisted this
dramatic increase in the transfer of information. While there is no
precise demarcation line between an early generation cellular phone
and a "smart phone," for the purposes of this Note, a "smart phone"
is defined as any phone with the ability to engage in non-voice, non-
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thank my family for their love and support, Professor George Bisharat for his guidance
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Quarterly's Volume 38 staff for all of their hard work and dedication.
2. John Markoff, Business Technology; Jams Already on Data Highway, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1993, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/03/business/ business-
technology-jams-already-on-data-highway.html.
3. A Special Report on Managing Information: Data, Data Everywhere, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 71.
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SMS (also known as "texting") communication. In order to do so,
these phones must have the ability to connect to remote computers.'
These include web servers to access the World Wide Web, email
servers to check correspondence, proprietary servers used to
download third-party applications (e.g., the iPhone's App Store, the
Android operating system's Market, or the Blackberry App World),
and even computers in one's home, from DVRs to a home desktop or
laptop.
The focus of this Note will be on the search and seizure of the
data that is both contained within and accessible by these devices.
The sheer amount of information that a law enforcement officer may
glean from these becomes apparent when one considers that the
applications that can be installed offer the ability to do everything
from connecting to one's home computer to signaling warnings when
nearing speed traps to "nearly every imaginable function of the office
and home entertainment center."' These myriad uses have appealed
to a growing number of users, with estimates suggesting that by 2013,
roughly half of the mobile phone market (currently around 173
million units) will be smart phones.
For those that own one, their smart phone has been described as
a "concierge," a "lifeline," or more broadly, "the remote control of
our lives."' These anecdotal descriptions seem hyperbolic, but global
mobile phone data traffic continues to increase-with rates greater
than 200 terabytes per month expected in 2010 (six times the amount
in 2009).9 The quantity of data being passed through these devices,
coupled with their constant presence at their users' sides, means that
access to one's smart phone can potentially reveal more information
about a user than even a search of one's home computer might."o
4. This usually entails having a separate data plan to connect to the World Wide
Web, e-mail servers, and the like. While this definition may seem a bit unwieldy, this
directly addresses the differences that make a smart phone "smart" as most cell phones
have the ability to use voice and SMS (short message service or "text") communication.
5. Id.
6. John Boudreau, Your Phone, Your Life: Applications For Your iPhone,
Blackberry or Other Mobile Device Are Changing How You Navigate Your World, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 15,2009, at 1A, available at 2009 WLNR 5010619.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Jon Fortt, iPhone Overload!, FORTUNE, Sept. 14, 2009, at 37.
10. Boudreau, supra note 6 ("Because their smart-phone is with them everywhere
they go, people develop far closer attachments to the devices than to their home PCs or
laptops .... Nothing is as close to us all the time-not even your spouse or partner.").
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A problem arises when one considers that while a search of a
''regular" computer will often require a warrant simply due to its
location within a home, a smart phone's portability makes it more
susceptible to exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's provision that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."n The exigency
exception and the search incident to arrest exception are two ways by
which law enforcement officers can get access to the massive data
stores from an individual's smart phone." Some courts have held that
the mere fact that the item to be searched was a cellular phone
provided an exigency that justified a warrantless search, 3 while others
have defended searches incident to arrest because the cellular phone
was no different from any other closed container." Nearly all
jurisprudence on this subject deals with cellular phones but currently
it seems that the same standards would be applied to smart phones."
Yet, as discussed above, both the quantity and quality of the
information stored on a smart phone, coupled with its constant
presence at its user's side, seem to indicate that new standards are
needed.
While scholars have discussed various methods to address these
problems and update search and seizure doctrine for the Information
Age, nearly all have done so by treating smart phones as immense
and complex file cabinets. 6 While this comports with decades of
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Lottie, No. 3:07-cr-51-AS, 2007 WL 4722439, at *2-*5
(N.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 2007).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Zamora, 2006 WL 418390, at *4 (investigating agents'
"reasonable beliefs . . . [regarding] the function and limitation of the cell-phone
technology" provided an exigency that justified the warrantless search); United States v.
Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1304 (D. Kan. 2003) (law enforcement agents were justified
in searching cell phone's call log by exigency of preventing potential destruction of
evidence).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277-78 (D. Kan.
2007) (justifying search of a cell phone's contents because scope of search incident to
arrest extends to "containers found on the arrestee's person" in order to preserve
evidence of the arrestee's crime).
15. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 27, 45 (2008) ("The difference between the data found on a cell phone and an
iPhone is dramatic but, at present, the Fourth Amendment and its search incident to arrest
doctrine make no distinction.").
16. See, e.g., id., at 40-41, 43 (noting that the container analogy is strained and
inadequate, Gershowitz distinguishes between a regular cell phone and an iPhone by
stating that "the former stores tremendously more information and in a very different
way"); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 549
(2005) (Kerr states that the starting point for analyzing how the Fourth Amendment
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Fourth Amendment precedent, it doesn't take into account three
important factors: (1) the characteristic of files stored on smart
phones to contain information beyond the actual content of the file
(broadly referred to as metadata) and (2) the ability to access distant
computers remotely from smart phones and (3) vice versa, the ability
to access the smart phone remotely from a distant computer. If one
were to analogize to a piece of property accurately, it might behoove
one to delve into fantasy. An accurate analogy for a smart phone's
capacity might be Mary Poppins' carpetbag or Hermione's handbag
from Harry Potter, both of near infinite proportions. Yet, even those
analogies do not describe a smart phone completely accurately as
those items cannot access remote places. Continuing with this
exercise, we would need to borrow from science fiction, adding some
sort of wormhole or tunneling device allowing the smart phone owner
to reach distant places from the phone and, conversely, to reach into
the phone from those distant places. Yet, this only describes the
smart phone's abilities; we must also consider the data contained
therein. Metadata can be thought of as the interior of Russian
matryoshka dolls, with layers of information nested within each other,
but this analogy is insufficient as well because the content and its
metadata are rarely, if ever, similar. In order to accurately describe
metadata, one must delve even deeper into mythology and search for
examples of inanimate objects describing the activities and
whereabouts of their holders; in this case, the matryoshka dolls would
have to be able to talk.
Though these attempts at analogy are deliberately ludicrous,
they serve to illustrate the deficiencies of property analogies in the
context of smart phones. It has been said that, "[a]ny sufficiently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic"" and at the
time the Fourth Amendment was drafted, smart phones might well
have been considered magical. This is only relevant because courts
have shown reluctance to rule on Fourth Amendment issues without
analogies to past jurisprudence, which is nearly entirely based on
tangible property principles.
This Note attempts to describe the current state of Fourth
Amendment policy and show that its current trajectory will lead to
untenable results as smart phones become even more prevalent and
should apply to a search of a computer is to "compare computers to homes and sealed
containers.").
17. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS
OF THE POSSIBLE 36 (Harper & Row 1962).
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people begin to use them to their full potential. Part I is a history of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which establishes the importance
of seeking property analogies in developing new search and seizure
tests by examining the history of courts' treatment of new technology.
Part II distinguishes the different types of information accessible via
smart phones, focusing on the metadata that is not readily apparent to
the user. It describes the difference between "content" and "coding"
information and divides these categories even further. "Content"
information is divided into the data stored on the phone and data
stored in the "cloud" (a technical term used to refer to data on
remote servers) and "coding" information is split into coding data
that is visible to the user and the nonvisible "metadata." Procedures
for dealing with these overlapping areas are proposed. Part III briefly
discusses the ability to access smart phones remotely and the
potential implications this has on searches and seizures pursuant to a
warrant.
I. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence and the Importance of
Property Analogies in Establishing New Tests
Since its drafting, the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" has been a slowly changing
doctrine. While courts have refined their analyses over the years, the
pace at which they have progressed has been glacial relative to
changes in society and technology. This disparity has become even
more apparent with the advent and rapid integration of computers
into nearly every facet of society.
However, the inertia of the Supreme Court has been apparent
since the early years of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The initial
focus of the Court was on the search and seizure of tangible items and
thus was based primarily on an analysis of property rights." This was
in line with the Framers' intent to combat the abuses of the colonial
era such as the infamous writs of assistance, which allowed officials to
conduct virtually unlimited searches.'9 In Olmstead v. United States,
18. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (construing a law requiring
the production of books and papers as an unconstitutional search and seizure); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment
protection is confined to the protection of tangible items and the physical invasion of real
property as opposed to interception of information via wiretaps).
19. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 48-50 (2008).
173
one of the first cases dealing with the application of the Fourth
Amendment to technology, the Court construed protection of
people's "houses, papers, and effects" quite literally and held that
conversations intercepted via wiretaps placed on phone lines located
outside Olmstead and his codefendants' homes did not constitute a
search or seizure because the conversations were not tangible and
because government officials had not physically invaded the home.20
It took thirty-nine years for the Court to overturn Olmstead and
shift the focus of its analysis from property to privacy rights. In Katz
v. United States, a wiretap scenario similar to that of Olmstead was
held to be a search and seizure because Katz had a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of privacy in his conversation in an enclosed
phone booth.21  The shift from a property to a privacy analysis is
apparent in the Court's oft-quoted adage: "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." 2
Yet, though the focus has shifted to determining whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is searched or
seized, the Court still continues to use property principles in making
those decisions, often focusing on the sanctity of the home. 23  It
distinguishes between information transmitted from a police
"beeper" located within a home 24 and one transmitting from a car;25
between the curtilage of a home and open fields that may be on the
same property; 26 and even between technology that can detect activity
around homes and that which can detect activity within homes.27
20. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-66.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
22. Id. at 351.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
24. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13.
25. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
26. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Note that the "open field"
doctrine dates back further than contemporary jurisprudence, but the emphasis on the
sanctity of the home existed even in common law. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59
(1924) ("[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The
distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.").
27. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (allowing evidence of a patch of
marijuana detected from a plane flying over the property); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 37-38 (2001) (forbidding the use of thermal imaging technology to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion; Justice
Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, also hinged his argument on property principles,
stressing that there was no "physical penetration" of the home).
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Even though these decisions were ostensibly based on a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, the Court approvingly
quotes pre-Katz case law in Kyllo v. United States, stating, "'[a]t the
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."'
Even outside the home, the location of a potential piece of
evidence is regarded as quite important. Courts have held that
vehicles can be searched with probable cause sans warrant, even if the
vehicle is used as a home.29 Nowadays, if a closed container turns up
during the search of the vehicle, the police can open the container if it
is capable of containing the object of the search but from 1977 to
1982,3 the "Court [drew] a curious line between the search of an
automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of
a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile."" Contrary
to the relative inviolability of the home, here the simple placement of
a container in a vehicle can make it more readily subject to search
and seizure.
Use of these property analogies continues in dealing with
intangibles, such as computer data. For example, many courts have
taken an approach that classifies data stored in a computer as a form
of "writing" or "record" and the computer itself as a "container." 32
28. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
29. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-95, 406 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The motor home in this case, however, was designed to accommodate a breadth of
ordinary everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate that its height, length, and
beam provided substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a table; cupboards
provide room for storage of personal effects; bunk beds provide sleeping space; and a
refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages. Moreover, curtains and large
opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the exterior of the vehicle. The
interior configuration of the motor home establishes that the vehicle's size, shape, and
mode of construction should have indicated to the officers that it was a vehicle containing
mobile living quarters.").
30. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (holding warrantless searches of
luggage/closed containers unconstitutional); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580
(1991) (eliminating the warrant requirement for closed containers in a motor vehicle).
31. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
32. See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Vt. 1998) (As most data
is stored on "computers and computer disks .... [p]robable cause existed to search for
and seize the computer-related property because probable cause existed to search for the
records concerning the individuals and entities listed in the [warrant]."); United States v.
Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (D. Colo. 1986) (scope of search warrant for "'all
records"' includes computer diskettes and the data therein); Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d
449, 454-55, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (scope of search warrant for "'notes and records
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Other courts have followed the lead of United States v. Carey, which
acknowledged that "the file cabinet analogy may be inadequate" and
ruled that law enforcement officers should take a "special approach"
to the search and seizure of computer data.33 This "special approach"
entails a targeted search for the files that are the object of the warrant
and instructions to law enforcement officers to not stray outside the
scope of the warrant.' However, while this "special approach"
purports to distinguish between a container and a computer storage
system, courts generally treat the difference between the two as one
of scale and not of inherent difference.3 ' The Carey court attempted
to explain the inadequacy of the "file cabinet" analogy by explaining
that computers can store massive quantities of data and usually
contain "intermingled" documents.36  In other words, computer
systems are still like file cabinets, just massive file cabinets containing
a wide variety of files. The court in United States v. Williams
acknowledged this while disagreeing with the Carey court, holding
that "the sheer amount of information contained on a computer does
not distinguish the authorized search of the computer from an
analogous search of a file cabinet containing a large number of
related to the sale of marijuana"' allowed search of computer files as well as physical
records); People v. Loorie, 630 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485-86 (County Ct. 1995) (refusing to
require a second warrant for the data contained in a seized computer by drawing analogies
between the examination of the computer data located on the seized drives and "the
removal of documents from an envelope; from the breast pocket of a nylon jacket; and
from a locked briefcase.") (internal citations omitted); People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153
(Colo. 2001) ("computers found in the defendant's closet were reasonably likely to serve
as 'containers' for writings, or the functional equivalent of 'written or printed material"'
for purposes of the scope of the warrant); United States v. Lucas, No. 3:08CR-26-C, 2008
WL 4858197, at *6 (W.D.Ky. Sep. 23, 2008) ("[T]he electronic storage of such information
is sufficiently widespread that a reference to 'records' in a consent to search form naturally
may be assumed to include electronic versions of records, as well as hard copies thereof.").
33. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); see also In re Search of
3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 955, 957-58 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that the
"particularity" requirement for warrants and the potential of "intermingling" of
documents on a computer allows a court to impose a requirement that the "government ...
provide a protocol outlining the methods it would use to ensure that its search was
reasonably designed to focus on documents related to the alleged criminal activity.");
People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800, 807 (Sup. Ct. 2003) ("[A] warrant authorizing a
search of the text files of a computer for documentary evidence pertaining to a specific
crime will not authorize a search of image files containing evidence of other criminal
activity.").
34. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275.
35. See id.
36. Id.
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documents."37  Thus, regardless whether or not the "special
approach" is used, courts still view computers as little more than
containers or, at best, immense file cabinets.
These examples are not provided to disparage current analyses,
but to provide a background for the methods that courts use in
dealing with novel problems and their continued emphasis on
analogies to physical objects. While Katz may have signaled an
acknowledgment of the importance of intangible information as
something that should be protected by the Fourth Amendment, this
information is still treated as something tangible-something which
can be seized and searched similar to one's "papers" or "effects."
Application of Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test can be
conducted by analogy to closed containers. In the United States
Department of Justice manual regarding protocols for dealing with
the search and seizure of electronic evidence, law enforcement
personnel are instructed to "treat the computer like a closed
container such as a briefcase or file cabinet."38 While there is some
debate over whether a computer is a single closed container or each
file is a separate closed container," the analogies to tangible property
remain.
Suffice it to say that any attempt to formulate a new approach to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for applications to new
technologies must at least have its roots in property analogies.
Professor Orin Kerr refers to computers as "virtual warehouses" and
writes that "[t]he first step [in applying the Fourth Amendment to
computers] should be to compare computers to homes and sealed
containers."4 In his article "The iPhone Meets the Fourth
Amendment," Professor Adam Gershowitz acknowledges that the
shift from early-generation cellphones to smart phones "drastically
change[d]" the landscape, but also observes that courts continue to
37. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010).
38. H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 2-3 (2009),
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf.
39. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the scope of a search was exceeded when the police examined "more items within a closed
container than did the private searchers" who had originally discovered evidence of
wrongdoing); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273-75 (holding that examining additional image files to
find evidence of child pornography did exceed the scope of a search meant to search for
evidence of drug sales).
40. Kerr, supra note 16, at 539, 549.
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treat smart phones as "digital container[s]," albeit large ones.4 In a
recent article focusing on warrantless searches of smart phones,
Matthew E. Orso argues that smart phones should be treated as
computers.42 If courts adopted this approach, courts would likely
invalidate warrantless searches of smart phones,43 and if there were a
warranted search of a smart phone it would still be treated as what
Kerr calls a "virtual warehouse."
II. Distinguishing Between Types of Information Accessible on
and Via Smart Phones and the Untenability of Maintaining a
Coding/Content Dichotomy
To understand better the amount and variety of information that
can be stored on or accessed via a smart phone, it helps to categorize
the data. A good starting point is to separate the data into "coding
information" and "content-based information." Content-based
information is the "substance" of data whereas coding information is
information about the parties to a communication." These two
categories shall serve as our basic grammar. This Note divides each
of these categories as follows: Where content-based information is
concerned, we distinguish between data stored on the phone and data
stored on remote servers (so-called "cloud" data). For coding
information, we shall distinguish between data visible to the user and
data hidden from the user. These distinctions are important to not
only understand the wealth of information that is stored on smart
phones, but also to assist in conducting an analysis of users'
reasonable expectations of privacy in this data.
Courts and commentators have generally concluded that
content-based information ought to receive more protection than
coding information.45 Content-based information is analogous to the
41. Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 38-41.
42. Matthew E. Orso, Note, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New
Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 223-24
(2010).
43. Id. at 224.
44. Orso, supra note 42, at 187-88.
45. Orso, supra note 42, at 193-94 (citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529
F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008) rev'd, City of Ontario v. Quon, No. 08-1332, 560 U. S. -,
(June 17, 2010)). The Quon cases address a situation in which the Ontario Police
Department searched a SWAT team member's text messages for evidence that he violated
the city's policy against using them for personal matters. City of Ontario v. Quon, slip op.
at 2-5. The search revealed personal messages to his wife-some with sexual content-
and messages to another SWAT team officer with whom he reportedly was having an
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:1178
Fall 2010] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SMART PHONES
protected conversation in Katz.46 By contrast, coding information is
analogous to the unprotected, dialed phone numbers captured by a
pen register.47 In Quon v. Arch Wireless, the Ninth Circuit used this
analysis to find that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of text messages.' While the Supreme Court reversed that
decision in City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court assumed throughout its
opinion that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his messages. 49  Nevertheless, when one delves even
further into these categories, the distinctions between the two begin
to blur for the purposes of privacy analysis.
Imagine that Smart Phone User A snaps a picture of her friend,
Smart Phone User B, and then e-mails the photo to B with the
message, "You look good!" The content-based information created
and transferred during this exchange is not limited to the picture
stored locally on A's smart phone, but also includes a copy of the
photo and the message stored on a cloud email server.o The
affair. Id. Note that while the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, it
declined to reach the issue of distinguishing between different categories of information
and instead decided the case based on an analysis of an employee's reasonable expectation
of privacy. Id. at 11-12. The Court did mention in dicta that "[c]ell phone and text
message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be
essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification." Id.
at 11.
Yet, it seems clear that the Court has ways to go in understanding how to deal with the
wide variety of information that is exchanged electronically. In the oral arguments, Chief
Justice Roberts and counsel for respondent Quon shared a colloquy in which the Chief
Justice stated that one "can't have a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the fact
that their communication is routed through a communications company" and counsel
responded that one would "expect that some company, I'm sure, is going to have to be
processing the delivery of the message." Transcript of Oral Argument at 48:22-24:1-5, Id.
(No. 08-1332). The Chief Justice responded, "Well, I didn't-I wouldn't think that. I
thought , you know, you push a button; it goes right to the other thing." Id. at 49:3-5.
Earlier, he wondered what happened when "he [Quon] is on the pager and sending a
message and they're trying to reach him for, you know, a SWAT team crisis? Does he-
does the one kind of trump the other, or do they get a busy signal?" Id. at 44:1-5.
46. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
47. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); see also Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d
at 904, rev'd,No. 08-1332, 560 U. S., (June 17, 2010) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 742 (1979)).
48. Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d at 910, rev'd, No. 08-1332, 560 U. S._, (June 17, 2010).
49. City of Ontario, No. 08-1332, slip op. at 13. For more on the Court's decision, see
supra note 45.
50. Without delving too deeply into the technical details of e-mail transfer protocols,
when sending an e-mail from a smart phone or any other computer, a copy will be stored
on at least one intermediate remote mail server. See generally Steven Baker, Serving up
mail: POP and IMAP, UNIX REVIEW, Nov. 1996, at 25.
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difference between local and cloud data is important: While Smart
Phone User A has a locally stored copy of the picture, Smart Phone
User B can view the content of the picture without permanently
storing anything locally. In other words, Smart Phone User B (or the
law enforcement officer searching her phone") is not actually looking
at a file on her phone," but rather using the phone to peer at a picture
stored at a remote location.
In addition to the content-based information, coding data is also
transmitted from A to B, or more accurately, B's cloud. This data is
composed of information visible to the user, such as information
about when and to whom the email was sent. Additional information
about the picture, data that is not readily visible to the user, is also
sent. Such information includes the smart phone model, the time that
the picture was taken, whether the picture was edited, and in some
instances, the latitude and longitude of where the picture was taken,
and even the name of the phone owner.
The simple content/coding dichotomy shows its deficiencies
when applying current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to it. In
Smith v. Maryland, the Court stated that allowing warrantless
searches of the numbers dialed on a phone was allowable because the
user voluntarily exposed information that the phone company had
"facilities for recording and that it was free to record."54 Following
this line of analysis, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Forrester
that computer surveillance used to obtain e-mail to/from addresses as
well as website IP addresses visited by the defendant were
"constitutionally indistinguishable ... from the pen register that the
51. Email servers require authentication, usually in the form of a user name and
password, which in this scenario raises issues of consent and whether a person should have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in information which that has been protected by a
password. However, in order to constrain the scope of this Note, we will assume that
email is being accessed through an application that saves this authentication information.
For further analysis on the effects that passwords have on this information see generally
David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2205 (2009).
52. This point may be disputed in that the picture is stored on the local cache during
viewing, and may be stored locally for a short time thereafter. The local cache is an area
within the memory storage of the phone to facilitate quick viewing of files. This illustrates
yet another gray area in the classification of data, making it even more difficult to
differentiate between local and remote data.
53. Johannes Ullrich, Twitpic, EXIF and GPS: I Know Where You Did it Last
Summer, SANS INTERNET STORM CENTER (Feb. 10, 2010), http://isc.sans.org/
diary.html?storyid=8203.
54. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 745.
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Court approved in Smith," and that they "constitute addressing
information and reveal no more about the underlying contents of
communication than do phone numbers."" Using this line of
reasoning, courts might reasonably conclude that much of the
information discussed in the above example may be accessed by the
government without triggering a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Nevertheless, when the content-based and coding information
categories are divided, it quickly becomes apparent that coding
information can contain quite a bit of content and is more closely
analogous to the Katz conversations than to the phone numbers in
Smith." Based on such an analogy, coding information is deserving of
much greater Fourth Amendment protection than it has heretofore
received.
A. Content-Based Information
1. Content-Based Information Stored on the Phone
The storing of content-based information directly on the smart
phone is the closest that smart phones come to fitting the "closed
container"/virtual file cabinet paradigm. Most jurisprudence deals
solely with this data as most information that could be gleaned from
cell phones prior to the advent of smart phones fell into this category.
Courts have allowed this data to be searched sans warrant under a
variety of different warrant exceptions including inevitable
discovery," exigent circumstances, and the plain view doctrine." In
United States v. Mercado-Nava, the court used the search incident to
arrest coupled with the exigency doctrine to go so far as justifying
copying the memories of two cell phones found on the defendant for
55. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (2008).
56. See Schuyler B. Sorosky, United States v. Forrester: An Unwarranted Narrowing of
the Fourth Amendment, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1138-39 (2008).
57. United States v. Ortiz, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1143 (D. N.M. 2004) (holding that as
the phone would have been searched legally later pursuant to a subsequently issued search
warrant, "discovery of the information contained in the pager and the cell phone would
have been discovered inevitably").
58. Zamora, 2006 WL 418390, at *4-*5 (holding that there was an exigent risk that
evidence would be deleted because a number stored in cell phone's memory could be
deleted upon receiving a new call).
59. United States v. Diaz, 494 F.3d 221, 226, 226 n.5 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the
seizure of a cell phone and search of its call log was valid under the plain view exception,
but noting that "it is unclear whether the method by which the information was gleaned
constituted a search").
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later search.60 In part, the court based its decision on the fact that law
enforcement retrieved only locally stored numbers.1 It is easy to see
how a court, like the district court in Mercado-Nava, can look at a
phone and conclude that it is similar to an address book. When
dealing with locally stored data, courts' use of container analogies is
at its most appropriate and justifiable.
2. Content-Based Information Stored in the Cloud
File cabinet analogies and the like begin to unravel when
extended to cover remotely-as opposed to locally-stored content-
based information. Much of the data that is viewed on a smart phone
is not stored locally, but is instead stored on third party servers.
According to decisions like Forrester, which are based on the Smith v.
Maryland pen register "exposure to a third party" test, it seems that
because the user is voluntarily "turning over" this information to
third parties, the user no longer has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information and therefore, it is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.62 While decisions like Quon attempted to limit
the potential slippery slope by distinguishing between the third
party's viewing of content and viewing of coding information, the
lines become blurred when considering anything other than
something that can be easily analogized to a letter or a phone call.63
Recent commentators have tried to distinguish between information
in which the cloud provider has an interest (such as search terms used
in a search engine) and information in which the provider simply
serves as a storage space (such as "the content of a calendar, address
book, photo album, text document, or private blog"), arguing that
60. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
61. Id. at 1275-76.
62. See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
63. See Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d at 905-06, rev'd, No. 08-1332, 560 U. S._, (June 17,
2010) ("As with letters and e-mails, it is not reasonable to expect privacy in the
information used to 'address' a text message, such as the dialing of a phone number to
send a message."). Note that the Supreme Court's reversal of Arch Wireless focused on an
analysis of an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in employer-owned
technology rather than the content/coding or remote/local dichotomies. See supra note 45.
However, while not addressed in the opinion, in oral arguments, counsel for Quon made
an attempt to analogize the text message to a letter sent to the post office for further
delivery. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49:20-50:4, City of Ontario, 560 U.S. - (No. 08-
1332) (in response to Justice Scalia's question of whether one could print the "spicy
conversations out and circulate them," counsel responded that "when I get a piece of mail
from somebody, I could do that as well, but it doesn't mean that the government gets to go
to the Post Office and get my mail before I get it.").
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'any such data that the provider is not directly interested in should
not be understood to be open to search via consent or a waiver of
Fourth Amendment protection."6 However, even if courts followed
this distinction for warranted searches, there are still problems when
dealing with searches that fall under warrant exceptions.
This difficulty is apparent when considering something that is
clearly content data solely stored on third party servers but that is
accessed just as local files might be from a typical smart phone user's
point of view. Examples include personal calendars, planners,
address books, photo albums, text documents, and private blogs.65
The Supreme Court has considered concealment efforts in
determining a reasonable expectation of privacy." This seems to
make a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis paradoxically
subjective when considering that each smart phone user may use a
variety of different methods to protect the information stored on
these servers from public access, but is still technically exposing it to
third parties. Commentators have compared the proprietors of
these servers to landlords of storage facilities and have argued that
this would mean that law enforcement is kept from using these
"[landlords] as a means to enter a private space."6 This analogy does
not hold in the smart phone context, because the user is interacting
with the data just as if it was stored locally.69 In the case of a storage
64. Couillard, supra note 51, at 2237-38.
65. While common sense would suggest that posting the aforementioned data on
public web sites would expose it to the plain view doctrine, for the purposes of this Note,
assume that we are solely dealing with private information, limited to either the creator or
possessor of the data or a select group of people who have been invited to view it.
66. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain
view.").
67. Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/technology/17privacy.html ("In social
networks, people can increase their defenses against identification by adopting tight
privacy controls on information in personal profiles. Yet an individual's actions,
researchers say, are rarely enough to protect privacy in the interconnected world of the
Internet.").
68. Couillard, supra note 51 at 2237-38 ("[T]he service provider has a copy of the
keys to a user's cloud 'storage unit,' much like a landlord or storage locker owner has keys
to a tenant's space, a bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal carrier has the
keys to a mailbox." (citing Arch Wireless, 529 F.3d at 905)).
69. An example of this would be the Android operating system's "Live Folders,"
which both allow application developers to display any remote source of data and allow
the user to interact with it just as if it was a local folder. Romain Guy, Live Folders,
ANDROID DEVELOPERS BLOG (April 24, 2009), http://android-
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unit, the owner or renter knows that his or her possessions are being
stored elsewhere and may take appropriate steps to protect them.
With a smart phone, the average user-or more importantly, the
average law enforcement officer searching the phone under a warrant
exception-will not be able to distinguish between data stored locally
and data stored in the cloud.
3. Overlap Between Local and Cloud Content-Based Information
The difficulties in distinguishing between local and cloud
content-based information mean that there is currently no readily
usable standard for law enforcement to follow when searching a smart
phone. Law enforcement can easily exceed the scope of the search
without any sort of active wrongdoing on their part because the
closed container70 can seamlessly connect to remote virtual
containers," often without any clear demarcation between the two.
To add to the ambiguity surrounding this area of law, the scope of the
search will depend on whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant
or one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Each solution
needs to balance both the needs of law enforcement on the one hand,
and the protection of a person's Katz-prescribed "reasonable
expectation of privacy,"" on the other.
a. Searches of Local and Cloud Data Pursuant to a Warrant
If a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the Fourth
Amendment requires that the warrant shall "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.""
When looking at the particularity requirement as applied to
warranted smart phone searches, it is quite easy for a law
enforcement officer to stray outside of "the place to be searched."
This becomes quite important because if "officers' failure to realize
the overbreadth of [a] warrant [is] objectively understandable and
developers.blogspot.com/2009/04/live-folders.html. Another example would be the
"Dropbox" service that allows for the same functionality and has applications on the
iPhone, Blackberry, and Android-based phones. DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com/
anywhere (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
70. See Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-78 (analogizing cell phones to closed
containers).
71. See United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 n.16 (D. Mass. 2007)
(analogizing websites to a "file cabinet or other physical containers in which records can
be stored").
72. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonable," it doesn't invalidate the search.74 This means that if a
warrant specifies that a police officer can search a smart phone, he or
she can venture far from the "place to be searched" with no negative
consequences.
However, just because a law enforcement officer can enter into
an area doesn't mean that they are operating within the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment by doing so.7 1 While scholars have not
specifically addressed a warranted search of a smart phone and the
difficulties in distinguishing those areas subject to a valid search, it
stands to reason that allowing a search into any and all computers
that may be connected to the phone can create an impermissibly
broad search that violates a warrant's particularity requirement.
We need to create a framework whereby law enforcement may
conduct smart phone searches but where the Fourth Amendment
retains some teeth. If law enforcement is to remain within the bounds
of a warrant to search a smart phone, the solution is to devise some
way of demarcating between items that are stored on the phone and
items that are stored remotely. There are features that allow a user to
disable wireless access features of phones, thus preventing someone
using the phone from delving into remote content." If a smart phone
does not have an "airplane mode" or something similar, other
precautions can be taken to make sure that the scope of the search is
not exceeded, such as manually disabling wireless connections.
While it may seem hyperbolic at this juncture to compare the
search of a smart phone to the general warrants that were one of the
"important cause[s] of the American Revolution," as time passes
and smart phones become more and more ubiquitous and widely
connected to more and more computers, a search that is not confined
to the local data on the smart phone could conceivably expand its
74. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987).
75. See, e.g., Garcia v. Dykstra, 260 F. App'x 887, 897-98 (6th Cir. 2008) (officers
found a key by a padlocked storage unit and used it to enter and examine the premises,
thus constituting an unwarranted search because by locking the unit, the owners retained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents).
76. See, e.g., iPhone: Understanding airplane mode, http://support.apple.coml
kb/htl355 (last updated June 1, 2010) ("When airplane mode is on, .. . [n]o phone, radio,
Wi-Fi, or Bluetooth signals are emitted from iPhone and Global Positioning System (GPS)
reception is turned off, disabling many of iPhone's features.").
77. See, e.g., id.
78. United States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances & Improvements, Known
as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1993) (observing, "the
misuse of the hated general warrant is often cited as an important cause of the American
Revolution").
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scope to reach computers worldwide and, perhaps more importantly,
computers located in the home." Although property analogies may
be insufficient to describe fully the breadth and scope of the reach of
a smart phone, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence continues to
respect the sanctity of the home." To allow a warranted search of a
smart phone to give access to these other computers is stretching the
scope of a warrant into areas in which people certainly have
reasonable expectations of privacy.
b. Searches of Local and Cloud Data Pursuant to a Warrant Exception
The two exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement that would most likely affect searches of smart phones
(and cell phones in general) are the "search incident to arrest" and
"exigent circumstances" exceptions. Each raises its own concerns, but
as a preliminary issue, the argument that "an exigency exists merely
because information is stored on a cellular phone" is a legal fiction
that should be replaced by a more coherent standard that comports
with the policy reasons for the exception." The exigency exception to
the warrant requirement exists to deal with a certain type of situation.
There are three basic situations in which an exigency is justified: "if
lives are threatened, a suspect's escape is imminent, or evidence is
about to be destroyed."'
The argument for exigent circumstances based solely on the fact
that the item being searched is a cell phone attempts to use
destruction of evidence as their justification. A court using the
exigency exception reasons that if the owner of the phone receives a
call, this may delete or overwrite an earlier stored number.83 In
United States v. Parada, a good example of this type of case, the court
justifies this "exigency" by claiming that law enforcement "had the
authority to immediately search or retrieve ... the cell phone's
memory of stored numbers of incoming phone calls, in order to
prevent the destruction of evidence."' The court's reasoning is faulty
for two related reasons. First, the evidence of calls is not destroyed
79. See supra notes 24-27.
80. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 at 37 (discussing the "Fourth Amendment sanctity of
the home").
81. Orso, supra note 42, at 196.
82. United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
83. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1303-04.
84. Id. at 1304.
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because the cellular service provider stores this information."
Second, the service provider's storage makes this information
available by warrant. While this may seem redundant, it is worth
recalling that the Fourth Amendment evinces a "strong preference
for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant"' and unless
circumstances fall under one of the three "narrowly drawn" exigency
exceptions, the search cannot be justified.8 While courts afford some
deference to the "reasonableness of the officer's belief that exigent
circumstances existed,"" the Supreme Court has continually held that
"the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an
urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests."'
Unless there is some other exigency that can be demonstrated (and
one in particular will be discussed in Part III), the mere fact that the
item being searched is a cell phone should not be considered exigent
circumstances that would allow a warrantless search.
However, one might suggest that a warrant exception in the case
of a cell phone justifies an exigency in the case of a smart phone
simply due to its ability to connect to remote computers. In other
words, because a smart phone can access remote computers and these
computers may have information on them which could be deleted or
overwritten, the situation calls for a warrantless search to prevent the
destruction of evidence. This is clearly outside the scope of the policy
reasons for the exigent circumstances exception, especially if the
safeguard of switching the phone to a mode which limits all wireless
access is used." Limiting wireless access protects both the privacy
rights of the individual and allows law enforcement officers to prevent
access to the remote computers for the duration of the search. If
85. Orso, supra note 42, at 199 n.68 ("A cellular phone user for the past nine years,
the author has received a statement every month listing all incoming and outgoing calls
and text messages. This experience has been consistent among three separate cellular
phone companies-Verizon, U.S. Cellular, and TMobile-during this time period.
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that cellular companies do, in fact, retain records of
incoming and outgoing calls and text messages.").
86. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
87. United States v. Clement, 854 F.2d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. (citing United States v. Selberg, 630 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1980)); see
United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Martins, 413
F.3d 139, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Davis, 588 F. Supp. 2d 693, 702 (S.D. W.Va.
2008).
89. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
90. Furthermore, even data that has been deleted can be recovered using certain
forensic tools. See generally Jeannine Heinecke, An evolution in cell forensics, LAW
ENFORCEMENT TECH., Nov. 1, 2007, at 62.
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there is a situation in which law enforcement believes that evidence is
stored on remote computers, a warrant is the proper method for
retrieving it.
The other important warrant exception in which smart phones
might be implicated is when a search is conducted incident to arrest.
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court explained the rationale
and scope of this warrant exception:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction."
In New York v. Belton, the Court extended the holding in Chimel
to include the contents of containers, whether open or closed, within
the arrestee's reach.' In United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit used
the rationale of Belton to validate a warrantless search of a cell phone
incident to a drug arrest.' The court summarily dismissed Finley's
claim that "officers' post-arrest seizure of his cell phone from his
pocket was lawful, but ... [that] the police had no authority to
examine the phone's contents without a warrant," and instead held
that the phone's search was reasonable as incident to a valid custodial
arrest.94 "A majority of courts facing similar facts have agreed with
Finley's conclusion."'
However, the court in United States v. Park96 disagreed with
Finley's conclusion and showed some of the first sensitivity to the
unique issues raised by smart phones. In Park, law enforcement
91. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
92. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460-61 (1981).
93. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 260.
95. Orso, supra note 42, at 203 (citing United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242 (4th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007); United
States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005); United States v.
Brookes, No. CRIM 2004-0154,2005 WL 1940124 (D. V.I. June 16,2005)).
96. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007).
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officers arrested individuals while executing a warrant on a marijuana
growing operation.' While the defendants were being booked, their
phones were seized and later searched." The court distinguished
Finley on its facts, reasoning that the search in Finley was
"substantially contemporaneous" with defendant's arrest." Integral
to its decision were the unique abilities and capacity of smart
phones." While the court did not explicitly refer to the phones as
smart phones, it clarified in a footnote that "two of the searched
phones were T-Mobile Sidekick I1s; in addition to address books,
these phones feature e-mail accounts, text messaging, cameras, instant
messenging [sic], Internet capability, and video caller ID."'' It
recognized that:
Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record
incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address
books, calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and
pictures. Individuals can store highly personal information on
their cell phones, and can record their most private thoughts
and conversations on their cell phones through email and text,
voice and instant messages.*
The Park court's fear of the slippery slope involved in expanding
Chimelo3 is well-founded, considering that they did not even delve
into the issue of cloud data.
The approach taken by Park seems to be gaining favor as courts
begin to realize that newer phones cannot be compared to earlier
model cell phones and pagers. The Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari in Ohio v. Smith, a case in which the Ohio Supreme Court
reviewed the approaches of Finley and Park and decided that
searches of cell phones seized incident to arrest are unlawful if "the
search is unnecessary for the safety of law enforcement and there are
97. Id. at *2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *8.
100. Id. at *8.
101. Id. at *8 n.6.
102. Id. at *8.
103. Id. at *8-*9 ("Any contrary holding could have far-ranging consequences . ...
The Court recognizes that subsequent cases have extended Chimel's reach beyond its
original rationales.").
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no exigent circumstances."'0" Like the court in Park, the court in
Smith recognized modern cell phones as "multifunctional tools [that]
defy easy categorization.,",0s While the specific phone searched was
not a smart phone according to the definition given in this Note,'"O the
court noted in their section on "Legitimate Expectations of Privacy"
that "in today's advanced technological age many 'standard' cell
phones include a variety of features above and beyond the ability to
place phone calls."'" These features, combined with the "ability to
store large amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and
justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information
they contain.""" Further, "[o]nce the cell phone is in police custody,
the state has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting and
preserving evidence and can take preventive steps to ensure that the
data found on the phone are neither lost nor erased."'0
The decisions in both Park and Smith considered the policy
rationales for the search incident to arrest warrant exception, which
seems the proper way to determine a course of action for smart phone
searches. However, unless an argument is made that the smart phone
itself can be used as a weapon, the only remaining justification for a
search incident to arrest is to prevent the concealment or destruction
of evidence.' As this is the same rationale used to justify some of the
exigency searches, the analysis can be applied to either warrant
exception.
While it is true that a savvy user might be able to destroy
incriminating evidence quickly,"' the breadth and depth of
information stored on and able to be accessed by smart phones once
again distinguishes them from the devices that preceded them. While
an arrestee (or a person being searched with the exigent justification
that he or she might conceal or destroy evidence) might be able to
104. Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 952-54, 956 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-1377,
2010 WL 1922721 (Oct. 4, 2010).
105. Id. at 955.
106. See supra note 4. The cell phone had "phone, text messaging, and camera
capabilities" but the record does not indicate whether it had the ability to engage in non-
voice, non-SMS communication. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
107. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
108. Id. at 955.
109. Id.
110. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
111. Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 40 ("An arrestee familiar with the functions of his
cell phone could just as easily delete text messages or call logs as he could tear up a letter
or an incriminating list of addresses on a piece of paper.").
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easily rip up a piece of paper or even delete text messages or call logs,
being able to identify and delete incriminating data on a smart phone
is a task that requires skill to do quickly. Further, even if the user
were to somehow manage to perform a reset of the phone's
memory,1 ' the fact remains that much of the data is still stored in the
cloud and can be properly reached through a warrant.
This is not to say a smart phone search incident to arrest or an
exigent circumstance is always unconstitutional. There are certainly
instances in which a search of a smart phone is appropriate."'
However, care must be taken to confine the scope of the warrantless
search to its policy-driven parameters.
B. Coding Information
1. Visible to the User
The coding data that exists on a smart phone and is visible to the
user generally comprises the type of information that can be used to
"identify of a party to a communication without disclosing the subject
112. Wiping a smart phone's memory is a difficult feat, even for savvy users. It is hard
to imagine a user accomplishing a reset of any of the major smart phones during an
encounter with law enforcement. See, e.g., Gina Trapani, Completely Erase your iPhone's
Data, LIFEHACKER.COM, http://lifehacker.com/395743/completely-erase-your-iphones-
data (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) ("There's currently no Apple-provided method to securely
erase your iPhone's data, and previous owners' data has been found on refurbished
phones on sale at Apple. If you want to make your iPhone safe for resale by securely
wiping any trace of your personal information from it, it's possible-though not easy.");
Josh Law, How to reset a Motorola Droid, EHOW.COM, http://www.ehow.com/how
5634169hard-reset-motorola-droid.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) (detailing a five step
process that involves powering off the phone, holding a button for an extended period of
time, and holding buttons simultaneously); How do I reset my BlackBerry?,
BLACKBERRYFAQ.COM, http://www.blackberryfaq.com/index.phplHow do_I_reset _my-
BlackBerry%3F (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (even a soft reset which merely "re-establishes
communication between the Blackberry device and the computer" requires holding three
keys simultaneously).
113. See, e.g., United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, *4 (S.D. Ga.
2009) ("In this case, the officers seized McCray's cell phone from his pocket after
developing probable cause to believe that he had enticed a 14-year-old girl to engage in a
sexual act. Initially, the phone was placed on the tail gate of [defendant] McCray's pickup
truck. But after the discovery of the crack cocaine and the Polaroid photograph depicting
a naked adult female, Officer Balmer concluded that the phone's camera function might
contain evidence of either drug trafficking and/or molestation of a minor. Accordingly, he
briefly reviewed the images stored in the phone's memory. After finding lewd images of
J.W. on the phone, he secured the phone as evidence and for further review by SCMPD
detectives, who secured a warrant before conducting a more comprehensive search of the
phone.").
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matter of that communication."" 4  This encompasses "phone
numbers, email addresses, pager numbers, and other labeling
information that uniquely identifies an account""' in addition to the
date/time information associated therewith. For the most part, the
coding information visible to the user should be treated as similar to
any of the data stored locally, because it is nearly always visible on
the same screen as any content information. Nevertheless, because
coding information is so readily analogous to the information that is
aggregated by pen registers and trap and trace devices without it even
constituting a search,116 courts may attempt to leverage this into
allowing a search of the phone. Recall that a smart phone's versatility
poses a unique problem: whereas coding information in other
contexts may be readily viewed or captured separate from its
accompanying content,"' in the context of both warranted and
warrantless searches of smart phones, it often exists side-by-side with
content-based information."
2. Invisible to the User
The definition of coding information in this Note is a bit more
expansive than that proposed by earlier commentators.119 In addition
to information about the parties to a given communication, our
definition also encompasses data that may be invisible to the user of
the phone. This data may include everything from information about
the date and time a certain file was created or modified to the latitude
and longitude of the user when they snapped a picture with their
smart phone.' 20
As this data can generally only be accessed by savvy users and
sometimes only if files are transferred to computers, it seems as if this
data is relatively safe from governmental intrusion. However, due to
114. See Orso, supra note 42, at 187-88.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 742.
117. See Orso, supra note 42, at 190 (comparing exposing dialed telephone numbers to
the phone company and exposing address information on a letter to cell phone coding
information).
118. For an excellent discussion of the patent deficiencies in upholding searches on
grounds that the coding data in question was exposed for interception by service
providers, see Orso, supra note 42.
119. See Orso, supra note 42, at 188 ("Coding information describes data that reveals
only the identity of a party to a communication without disclosing the subject matter of
that communication.").
120. Ullrich, supra note 53.
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the probative nature of this information and its potential future use
by law enforcement,12 ' it is worth considering in this analysis. That
said, due to its nature as "invisible" coding information, it is highly
unlikely that this information would show up during a search
conducted pursuant to any of the warrant exceptions. Instead, it
would most likely be revealed during a warranted search.
The fact that this information will generally be viewed pursuant
to a warrant, which must "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized," 22 means that many
of the concerns of scope raised by warrantless searches are alleviated.
Despite the foregoing, it is not entirely clear if the scope of a search
warrant encompasses this "information about information." To
demonstrate, consider a hypothetical warrant allowing law
enforcement to search a smart phone for evidence of pictures of child
pornography. 23 While police officers find no evidence of child
pornography, they see what looks to be drug paraphernalia in some of
the pictures. Having access to the location and date/time information
about the photo can characterize the paraphernalia in many different
ways, from identifying a residence (or any location) that law
enforcement might believe they have probable cause to search or
establishing that the picture was innocently taken at a police drug
demonstration on a school campus. Here, suppose that the warrant
clearly established that law enforcement was directed to look for
pictures (content-based information, in other words), but instead
discovered potentially damning information that is arguably outside
the scope of the search (metadata). While the warrant did not
specifically authorize a search of the location and time of the pictures,
121. At the beginning of 2010, an image containing what appeared to be lines of
cocaine was posted to 4chan.org, a popular Internet message board with the message
"Long day at the office, you would not BELIEVE where the office is [by the way]." The
subsequent poster examined the EXIF ("exchangeable image file format"-"invisible"
coding data) information of the image file and identified the location of the image as being
taken at the White House. It was quickly picked up by various social networking sites and
blogs, until many dismissed it as a hoax. While this particular incident may demonstrate
the abilities of a savvy user to mislead with this information, it is most certainly illustrates
the potential for extracting probative information from this data. See Sara K. Smith,
Exciting White House Scandal Was Just A Prank!, WONKETTE (Jan. 15, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://wonkette.com/413200/exciting-white-house-coke-scandal-was-just-a-prank.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
123. The setup of this hypothetical is somewhat similar to the facts of United States v.
McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607 (S.D. Ga. 2009), in which a search incident to
arrest revealed some incriminating pictures of a minor and led to a warranted search of
the phone.
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the data was nonetheless revealed to law enforcement. 124 Does law
enforcement simply get to use this information as a "bonus" even
though the user may not have even been aware that the phone was
recording this information?
Though this information will likely be revealed pursuant to a
warrant, the "plain view" warrant exception is often used as the
justification for straying outside the scope of the warrant.'2 The plain
view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement, which
allows officers to seize evidence found in plain view during a lawful
observation.126 It requires that the officer be (1) lawfully present at
the vantage point from which the evidence is viewed, that he (2) have
"lawful right of access to the object" and, (3) that the "incriminating
character" of the object be "immediately apparent."l 21 Professor Orin
Kerr writes about the dilemma of "balanc[ing] the threat of general
searches against the public benefit of recovering additional
evidence.", 28 While speculating on some of the potential solutions to
this problem, he tentatively advocates abolishing the plain view
exception for digital evidence searches.129  He justifies this both in
terms of public policy and practical concerns:
Eliminating the plain view exception in digital evidence cases
would respect law enforcement interests by granting the
police every power needed to identify and locate evidence
within the scope of a warrant given the particular context-
sensitive needs of the investigation. At the same time, the
approach would protect privacy interests by barring the
disclosure of any evidence beyond the scope of a valid
warrant in most cases .... In short, it would allow the police
124. It is likely that law enforcement will see this data, even if this is not the object of
their search nor do they actively seek it out, as metadata is often used to, ironically
enough, limit the scope of the search. See Derek Haynes, Comment, Search Protocols:
Establishing the Protections Mandated by the Fourth Amendment Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures in the World of Electronic Evidence, 40 McGEORGE L. REV. 757,
772 (2009) ("Metadata is another valuable way to limit the scope of a search without
unduly burdening the government's interests in effective law enforcement.").
125. See, e.g., United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1151 (2006) ("There is no rule ...
that evidence turned up while officers are rightfully searching a location under a properly
issued warrant must be excluded simply because the evidence found may support charges
for a related crime (or against a suspect) not expressly contemplated in the warrant.").
126. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-137 (1990).
127. Id. at 136-37 (quotations omitted).
128. Kerr, supra note 16, at 571.
129. Id. at 582-83.
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to conduct whatever search they needed to conduct (to ensure
recovery) and then limit use of the evidence found (to deter
abuses)."
This seemingly radical approach has been adopted in part by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., in
which it held that "the government should, in future warrant
applications, forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine or any
similar doctrine that would allow it to retain data to which it gained
access only because it was required to segregate seizable from non-
seizable data."131 In other words, the use of electronic forensic tools32
and/or methods designed to probe the data for illegality are precluded
without specific authorization in the warrant.133
The situation that the Ninth Circuit addressed in Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc. is distinct in that it deals with intermingled discrete
documents," instead of a piece of data that is attached to the file
itself. Yet, the idea of forswearing the plain view doctrine is a useful
one for "invisible" coding data, especially because this coding
information can contain information that can reasonably be
categorized as content. The rapid proliferation of smart phones may
be the first step of the "new dynamics of digital evidence collection
and retrieval" and may further justify doing away with the plain view
requirement as a "sound doctrinal response to the new dynamics of
digital evidence collection and retrieval.""'
III. Remote Access of a Smart Phone's Contents
The last topic for discussion is the ability of a smart phone user
to remotely access his or her smart phone. While each smart phone is
different, nearly all have the ability to remotely access and/or delete
130. Id. at 583-84.
131. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.
2009) [hereinafter Comprehensive 1], rev'd en banc United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354, 2010 WL 3529247 (9th Cir. Sept. 13,
2010).
132. See supra note 124.
133. Comprehensive I, 579 F.3d at 999.
134. Id. at 997; cf Kerr, supra note, 16, at 571-73 (discussing United States v. Tamura,
694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982), the origin of the approach that the Ninth Circuit employed in
Comprehensive 1).
135. Kerr, supra note 16, at 583.
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information from afar. On some, this ability is built-in," while other
models require downloading third party applications.'37 Either way,
this ability lends credence to the policy concerns surrounding
destruction of evidence and the need to address those concerns
through warrant exceptions, such as those for exigent circumstances,
or to extend the scope of a search incident to arrest."' A law
enforcement officer might feel that this ability merits delving deeper
into the phone's contents instead of waiting for a warrant, because
even if the suspect is in custody, an accomplice could delete the
phone's data. Further, the ability itself may be seen to give rise to an
exigency. If law enforcement were to follow the "exposure-based"
approach suggested in the conclusion of this Note'" even if the
suspect was arrested, there would be time for a third party to delete
the information. Some might argue this doesn't fall under the narrow
exigency exception because it assumes the existence of an accomplice.
However, depending on the circumstances a court might defer to the
"reasonableness of the officer's belief that exigent circumstances
existed"'" and extend the scope of the search.' In other words,
because a third party could delete evidence, an officer should be able
to fully search the phone at arrest sans warrant.
There are two ways to assuage these well-founded concerns.
First, if someone were to remotely delete the data from a phone, it
would almost certainly meet the requirements for an evidence
tampering charge. 42 Second, even if a person is willing to risk
136. See, e.g., Dan Frakes, Inside iPhone 3.0's Remote Wipe Feature, MACWORLD (July
15, 2009, 7:52 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/141605/2009/07/remotewipe.html;
BLACKBERRY ENTERPRISE SERVER VERSION 4.1 POLICY REFERENCE GUIDE 152,
available at http://docs.blackberry.com/en/adnin/deliverables/3801/Policy-ReferenceGuide.pdf
(manual detailing how to remotely wipe Blackberry devices as an administrator) (last
visited Sept. 7, 2010).
137. See, e.g., Mobile Defense: Recover and Protect Your Mobile Phone,
https://www.mobiledefense.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
138. See supra Part II.
139. This Note suggests that the scope of a warrantless search should be confined to
the presently exposed screen on the phone. See Kerr, supra note 16, at 551.
140. Clement, 854 F.2d at 1119 (citation omitted).
141. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S at 236.
142. Evidence tampering is a statutory crime. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (2001)
(holding a person liable for a "misdemeanor if, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: (1) alters, destroys, conceals or
removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in
such proceeding or investigation; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or
thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant who is or may be
engaged in such proceeding or investigation").
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criminal liability to wipe the phone, law enforcement can use the
same precaution advised above to limit the scope of searches from
straying needlessly into the "cloud"; namely, the police officer can put
the phone in a mode that doesn't allow wireless communications.14
Just as this method prevents law enforcement from accessing remote
computers from the smart phone, it also will prevent access to the
smart phone from remote computers.
Conclusion
The challenges in applying the Fourth Amendment to new and
changing technologies are numerous and require a mix of precedent,
policy, and pragmatism to address them thoroughly. However,
getting the correct mixture of the three can be difficult. While courts
may continue to rely upon property analogies in dealing with Fourth
Amendment issues, they should take care to make sure that the
analogies do not oversimplify the issue. Further, they should consider
using the model proposed in this Note to assist with distinguishing
among data that can be accessed in a search of a smart phone.
A smart phone, by virtue of its versatility, is distinct from its
pager and cell phone predecessors. Likewise, a smart phone's
mobility and peculiar social niche distinguish it from the common
computer. Therefore, while Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for
either may seem analogous, courts should recognize that smart
phones have their own unique characteristics and contains a wealth of
data that neither cell phones nor computers have.
Categorizing the data found on a smart phone both clarifies and
confuses. While it helps to delineate between types of information
and separately consider the privacy expectations in each, the
demarcation is essentially artificial and may sometimes be quite
blurry. To muddy the waters even further, each search should be
separately considered in a warrant context and pursuant to a warrant
exception.
In the context of a search pursuant to a warrant, the most
important concern is that of scope. The scope of a warranted search
is constitutionally confined by the particularity of the warrant.
Courts must be careful not to let law enforcement exceed the scope of
a warrant to search a smart phone simply by virtue of the fact that the
lines between different data are hard to discern. There are
143. See supra Part II.A.iii.a.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
197
techniques to prevent encroachment onto remote computers 45 and to
prevent remote computers from encroaching onto the search.'" It is
even possible that smart phones may be the devices that usher in the
abolishment of the plain view doctrine as applied to warranted
searches. 4 1
The scope of the search is also important when considering a
search pursuant to a warrant exception. It is in light of this concern
that an "exposure-based approach" seems useful.'48 Professor Orin
Kerr defines a Fourth Amendment search as occurring "when
[metadata] is exposed to possible human observation" and uses this to
bridge the "physical world notions of searches to the context of
computers."'4 9 This means that whenever government agents see a
piece of information, whether it is content-based information or
coding data, they must have a rationale for that search. While other
commentators have posited different techniques for limiting the scope
of an unwarranted search of a smart phone,"o it seems parsimonious
to simply limit a search incident to arrest to the presently exposed
screen on the phone. The concerns regarding destruction of evidence
can be eliminated, or at least reduced, by switching off the wireless
connection.' Furthermore, if there is a great concern regarding
evidence that might be on the phone and would help resolve an
emergency, this would constitute exigent circumstances that would
justify a warrantless search. Otherwise, law enforcement can obtain a
warrant as the Fourth Amendment usually prescribes.
The full potential of smart phones has yet to be seen, but it seems
certain that their popularity will only continue to grow. As they reach
ubiquity, both in society and in people's lives, the expectation of
privacy in them will increase. It is important that courts set standards
that balance the needs of law enforcement with the peoples'
reasonable expectations of privacy to arrive at a conclusion that
comports with the Fourth Amendment and is readily administered.
145. See supra Part II.A.iii.a.
146. See supra Part III.
147. See Kerr, supra note 16, at 571, 582-84.
148. Id. at 551.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 15, at 44-57.
151. While these two proposals may be seen as inherently contradictory in that a law
enforcement official would have to go beyond the presently exposed screen to shut off the
wireless connection, this would only be done in the case of an exigency, which would
provide the justification for going beyond the presently exposed screen. See supra Part
II.A.iii.a.
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We are witnessing an explosion of technological growth. The
issues that are now emerging do not conform to the tidy analogies to
the rules that governed the comparably slow technological evolution
encountered by previous generations. To the extent that the digital
age has led us into uncharted waters, this Note represents a new
cartographic method. While it certainly does not consider every
eventuality, it maps out the contours of information in a way that
should have some conceptual stability. Further, it is built on a
premise that no one should reject-that the reasonableness of a
search should derive from the pre-legal expectations of the people,
rather than from the legal fictions that sometimes arise when recently
minted round pegs are forced into outmoded square holes.
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